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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
RONALD DALE EASTHOPE, Case No. 18310 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Aggravated Sexual 
Assault, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-405 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Ronald Dale Easthope, was charged by Information 
with Aggravated Sexual Assault, a First Degree Felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-405 (1953 as amended). On February 
8, 1982, the appellant was convicted by a jury as charged, and 
on February 17, 1982, was sentenced to incarceration in the 
Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of five years to 
life. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, Ronald Dale Easthope, seeks reversal of 
the judgment entered against him and a new trial in the court 
below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of September 19, 1981, in 
a basement apartment at 1010 Downington Street, Salt Lake City, 
• 
Utah, Hazel Jensen was raped at knifepoint by a person she described 
as wearing a pillow case mask, a levi jacket, white tennis shoes 
with blue stripes, and red and white gloves. (T. 39-40, 43-
44, 48-49) Ms. Jensen never saw her assailant's face and was 
consequently unable to directly identify anyone as the rapist, 
but did give a description which generally matched the appellant's 
size and build. (T. 46-47) 
After the appellant's arrest, the State filed a motion 
in the Fifth Circuit Court requesting hair samples and body 
fluids from the appellant. (T. Dece 4, p. 3) The motion was 
granted, allowing hair samples and blood to be taken from the 
appellant, which were later used at trial against the appellant 
over defense counsel's objections. (T. 324-25) 
Before the trial, defense counsel made a motion to sequester 
the jury, in order to prevent exposure of the jury to possible 
media coverage of the trial. (TD 3) This motion was renewed 
during the trial after counsel had observed news reports of 
the case which highlighted and drew attention to the court's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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gag order, on the grounds that anyone viewing or hearing of 
the news reoorts would at least wonder what the appellant had 
to hide. Defense counsel also moved the court to ask the jurors 
individually if any of them had seen or heard news reports of 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING 
THE BLOOD AND HAIR SAMPLES TAKEN FROM THE APPELLANT 
TO BE USED IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 
While the appellant was in custody and under arrest, 
but before the preliminary hearing and before the appellant 
had been bound over for trial, the State filed its motion 
to compel discovery in the Fifth Circuit Court. The motion 
was granted by that court over defense counsel's objection, 
oursuant to which the samµles of blood and hair were taken. 
However, the Fifth Circuit Court exceeded the scope of 
its authority in granting a discovery motion in this instance. 
This conclusion follows from the holding of this Court in Van 
Dam v. Morris, 571, P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977), 1 and that court's 
analysis of the statutory scheme. Although both the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and the Court system in Utah have been revised 
1. All statutory references are to Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), unless otherwise stated. 
-3-
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since the Van Dam decision, both the pertinent language of the 
new Code provisions and the new court structure are in all material 
respects the same as the analogous provisions discussed in Van 
Dam .. 
In Van Dam, this Court held that a city court judge (analogous 
to today's circuit court judge) presiding at a preliminary hearing 
on a felony case "does not sit as a judge of a court and exercises 
none of the powers of a judge in a court proceeding, except 
as they inhere in the office of magistrate" 2 The court then 
pointed out that a magistrate derives his power entirely from 
statute, and that the power conferred upon a magistrate conducting 
a preliminary hearing by the then existing statutes was "limited 
to discharging the defendant (77-15-17) or holding him for proceedings 
in the district court (77-15-19)." 3 The court then concluded 
that the powers granted to "the court" to dismiss an action 
(by then sections 77-51-1 through 4) were not held by a city 
judge while acting as a magistrate conducting a preliminary 
hearing, although the same judge did have the power to dismiss 
if sitting as a trial judge. 
2. 571 P.2d at 1327 
3. Id. 
-4-
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The present statutory scheme, which created the circuit 
courts in place of the old city courts, retains essentially 
the same procedural structure. Section 78-4-5 grants to the 
judge of the circuit court "the powers and jurisdiction of a 
magistrate, including proceedings for the preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause. . " Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure expounds upon the powers of the magistrate 
in conducting the preliminary hearing, giving him the power 
to bind over a defendant to district court upon a finding of 
probable cause. Rule 7(d)(l) then specifically provides that: 
"Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by 
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination." 
Thus, the magistrate is statutorily denied the power to decide 
questions of the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence, 
on either constitutional or statutory grounds. 
Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure deals with 
discovery in criminal cases. Throughout the entire provision 
various grants of power are made to "the court" to decide which 
items shall be discoverable. Subsection (g) gives to "the court" 
the power to impose sanctions for the failure to comply with 
the rule. Nowhere in the rule is a magistrate given any power 
concerning discovery. The fair import of the language of Rule 
16 evidence a legislative intent that the discovery process 
be under the direction of "the court" having jurisdiction to 
try the case, and not the magistrate who merely conducts the 
probable cause hearing. This intent is particularly highlighted 
-5-
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by the specific prohibition of Rule 7(d) mentioned above, which, 
when coupled with the provision allowing hearsay evidence at 
preliminary hearings, evidences a legislative intent to avoid 
potentially unnecessary disputes over the admissibility of evidence 
before it has ever been determined whether or not the trial 
itself is necessary. 
This analysis is identical to that used by the Van Dam 
court. If the magistrate conducting the preliminary hearing 
has no power to dismiss the case because the powers of the magistrate 
exist only as created by statute, and the statute gives the 
power to dismiss only to "the court", the same reasoning should 
apply to the power to compel discovery; since the statute only 
gives that power to "the court", the magistrate simply has no 
power to compel discovery. 
Indeed, this was the conclusion reached by Judge Dean 
E. Conder of the Third District Court in his Memorandum Decision 
in Cannon v. Keller, Miscellaneous No. M-80-88 (December 15, 
1980), where he faced precisely the issue now under discussion. 
Granting the oetitioner's Writ of Mandamus directing the circuit 
court judge to declare null and void his previous order compelling 
discovery, Judge Conder reasoned that the jurisdiction of a 
circuit court judge conducting a preliminary hearing for a felony 
case is limited to that of a magistrate. Since, at connnon law, 
no right to discovery existed, any such right must necessarily 
arise by statute or constitution. The constitution being silent, 
and the statute failing to grant power to a magistrate to compel 
-6-
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discovery, the circuit court was held to lack jurisdiction to 
issue the order of discovery in that case. 
The same result should follow in the present case. The 
appellant was unlawfully compelled to submit to the sampling 
of his blood and hair, and the evidence obtained therefrom is 
inadmissible. The use of inadmissible evidence denied the appellant 
his right to a fair trial and due process of law, was prejudicial 
because of the damning nature of the tests performed on those 
samples, and requires a reversal of the conviction rendered 
below. 
POINT A 
THE TAKING OF THE APPELLANT'S BLOOD SAMPLE WAS AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
Should this court agree that the circuit court was without 
jurisdiction to issue the motion compelling discovery in this 
case, then the hair and blood samples taken from the appellant 
were obtained without a valid search warrant, since no warrant 
was issued in the present case. And while the taking of the 
appellant's hair sample may have constituted such a slight intrusion 
into the body of the appellant that it was constitutionally 
permissible even absent a search warrant, 4 the same cannot 
4. See State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980) 
-7-
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be said of the blood sample. This was made clear by the United 
States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1966). 
Schmerber was an appeal from a conviction for driving 
an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The defendant was arrested at the hospital where he was being 
treated for injuries sustained in an accident. Against his 
will a blood sample was taken at that time and later introduced 
at trial as evidence of the defendant's intoxication. 
On appeal it was argued that admission of this evidence 
violated several of the defendant's constitutional rights. Although 
his conviction was upheld, the Supreme Court decided clearly 
for the first time that the law of search and seizure applies 
to body examinations for physical evidence. Most significantly, 
the court held that no physical evidence could be seized unless 
investigators first obtained a warrant or the facts of the situation 
justified a warrantless search under one of the traditional 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
The Court noted that, although this search of the defendant's 
body was conducted after his arrest, that fact alone could not 
purify a warrantless intrusion into his body. Whatever justification 
exists for a search pursuant to arrest do not apply to this 
sort of body search, the court added. 384 U.S. at 772. 
The court held that because the evidence of alcohol in 
the arrested person's blood was diminishing and would soon be 
eliminted altogether, its seizure fell under the traditional 
exception to the warrant requirement in emergency situations. 
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However, the court made clear that its holding was not to be 
interpreted too broadly: 
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this 
judgment only on the facts of the present record. 
The integrity of an individual's constitution does 
not forbid the States minor intrusions into an 
individual's body under stringently limited conditions 
in no way indicates that it permits more substantial 
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 
Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reiterated this principal 
in the subsequent case of Cupp v. Murphey, 412 U.S. 291, 93 
S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed. 2d 900 (1973). In that case the defendant 
appeled from his conviction of the murder of his wife on the 
grounds that scrapings from under his fingernails were improperly 
seized and used as evidence against him. 
In Cupp the defendant voluntarily appeared at the station 
house for questioning about his wife's murder. Investigators 
interrogating him noticed a dark spot under ·one of his fingernails, 
and realizing its potential relevance to the victim's death 
by strangulation, sought to examine the defendant's hands. When 
asked about the dark spots, he began to scrape at them himself, 
and at this time the defendant was subjected to a forcible examination 
of his nails. Thread from the victim's night gown and blood 
her type were found. 
The Supreme Court held that this search was not unreasonable 
despite the fact that the defendant had not been arrested or 
served with a warrant. The court's decision was based upon 
the emergency situation which existed where relevant evidence 
was about to be destroyed: 
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"The rationale of Chimel, in the circumstances, 
justified the policy in subjecting him to the very 
limited search necessary to preserve the highly 
evanescent evidence they found under his fingernails." 
(Em?hasis Supplied). 412 U.S. at 296 
In the instant case the defendant did not consent to 
the search of his body and the seizure of blood and hair samples. 
No emergency existed which justified this search without a warrant; 
there was no possibility of the evidence sought being destroyed 
through natural processes or by the defendant himself. Under 
Schrnerber the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
and his blood samples were improperly admitted into evidence. 
These standards are clearly applicable in State court 
proceedings as illustrated by the recent California case of 
People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 Po2d 624 (1975). The 
defendant was suspected of having swallowed several balloons 
of heroin to avoid their discovery when searched by police. 
She was forcibly administered an emitic which caused her to 
vomit and give up the balloons of heroin as expected. 
Although the defendant was searched pursuant to a warrant 
which authorized examination of her person and effects, the 
California Court held that its coverage did not extend to physical 
evidence. And since no emergency existed which justified a 
warrantless search of her body, the evidence was held to have 
been improperly seized. 
The Colorado Court has applied Schmerber in the same 
manner holding the withdrawal of a blood sample against the 
defendant's will was authorized only because of the emergency 
exception to the warrant requirement. People v. Smith, 175 
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Colo. 212, 486 P.2d 8 (1971). See also People v. Sanchez, 476 
P.2d 908 (Colo. 1970). 
The seizure of the appellant's blood in the present case 
for mere type testing could have and should have been carried 
out pursuant to a warrant. The failure to do so resulted in 
a search and seizure violative of the appellant's Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL.ERROR IN REFUSING 
TO POLL THE JURORS AS TO THEIR POSSIBLE EXPOSURE TO 
PUBLICITY OF THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND IN REFUSING TO 
SEQUESTER THE JURY. 
In 1971, the appellant was charged with a series of sexual 
assaults which occurred in the Sugarhouse area of Salt Lake 
City. The appellant was convicted on two counts of rape at 
that time and sentenced to prison. The 1971 trial was surrounded 
by considerable publicity, and the appellant was labeled by 
the press as the "sugarhouse rapist". (T. 2-5) Shortly after 
his parole in 1981, the appellant was charged with the aggravated 
sexual assault of which he now stands convicted. Surrounding 
the arrest and the preliminary hearing of this case was a fair 
amount of press coverage referring to the appellant as the "sugarhouse 
rapist". Typical headlines were, "Rapist charged again", and 
"Paroled 'Sugarhouse Rapist' Charged with Sexual Assault." 
It was this kind of publicity which caused defense counsel 
initially to make a motion to have the jury sequestered. (T. 
91-92) Since there were no media personnel in the courtroom 
at the beginning of the trial the motion was denied, with leave 
to reopen the motion if the situation should change. (T. 3) 
-11-
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By the second morning of trial, the situatipn had changed: 
Representatives of the media had arrived; the court had instructed 
the media not to refer to the appellant as the "Sugarhouse Rapist" 
or to refer to his prior criminal record (T. 91-92); and both 
the 6:00 o'clock and the 10:00 o'clock T.V. news on Channel 
2 had reported the progress of the trial. Both of those news 
reports had followed the judge's order, but had stated that 
the appellant was charged with a rape and that an order was 
entered which prohibited them from reporting certain things 
about the apµellant that were already of public record. (Te 
120-21). At this point, defense counsel renewed the motion 
to sequester the jury, and further moved to poll the jurors 
individually as to whether or not they had been exposed to any 
media coverage. The judge denied both motions, choosing instead 
to rely on his admonitions to the jury not to see, hear, or 
read media reports. (T. 120-21). 
The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is protected 
by both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941 (1925). This means 
that the accused has the right to a trial by a jury "free from 
outside influences", and that the verdict must be based on evidence 
presented at trial, and not upon evidence from other sources, 
such as the media. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362, 
86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1966). 
-12-
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With respect to the influence of publicity on the trial 
of an accused, two rules have been developed by the federal 
courts. The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in State v. Keliiholokai, 
569 P.2d 891 (Ha. 1977), gives an excellent analysis and summary 
of the case law developing these two rules. The appellant urges 
this Court to adopt the federal court analysis outlined below. 
First, whe·re extensive media reporting highly prejudicial to 
the accused comes to the attention of the jurors during the 
trial, a· clear denial of the right to a fair trial by an impartial 
jury has occurred, and the conviction will be reversed. Estes 
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed. 2d 543 (1965). 
In Estes, the confusion, distraction, and intensity of public 
feeling and pressure caused by live T.V. coverage of the proceedings 
were held to have denied the defendant of his right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury, because of the inherent possibility 
of prejudice. 
The second rule, relevant to the instant case, is applicable 
where the potential of prejudice is not obvious or inherent, 
and where the extent of the jury's exposure to the media reports 
is uncertain. In such an instance, where the trial court has 
been made aware of the media reports, that court must then determine 
"the extent and effect of the infection, and . . . take appropriate 
measures to assure a fair trial." United States v. Jones, 542 
F.2d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pomponie, 517 
F.2d 460, 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. den. 423 U.S. 1015, 96 
S.Ct. 448, 46 L.Ed. 2d 386 (1975). 
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This requires a two-step approach. The trial court must 
first determine whether or not "the nature of the news accounts 
rises to the level of being substantially prejudicial." Keliiholokai, 
569 P.2d at 895. If the news accounts are not substantially 
prejudicial, the inquiry is at an end and the court need do 
nothing further. Jones, 542 F.2d at 1940 If substantial prejudice 
is found, however, the· court must examine each juror. 
Individually and outside the presence of other 
jurors to determine the effect of the publicitye 
However, if no juror indicates, upon inquiry made 
to the jury collectively that he has read or heard 
any of the publicity in question the judge is not 
required to proceed further. Margoles v. United 
States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. 
den. 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed. 2d 84 
(1969); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 194 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
If the trial court fails to make at least an initial 
inquiry (where media reports are prejudicial) , the accused is 
thereby denied the opportunity to find out whether or not the 
jurors have been exposed to the reports -- i.e., whether or 
not the jurors are indeed free from outside influence. Such 
a failure constitutes reversible error, since the trial court's 
conduct in such an instance, even where the jurors have been 
instructed not to see, hear, or read media reports, is not a 
sufficient protection of the accused's right to a fair trial. 
Pomponio, 517 F.2d at 460. 
Turning to the facts of the present case, on the second 
day of trial the judge expressly refused to ask the jurors, 
either collectively or individually, whether or not they had 
seen or heard any news reports from the night before. In doing 
so, he stated, "I heard the news report. I don't think that 
-14-
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that was ?rejudicial". (T. 121) If this court chooses to adopt 
the federal analysis, the issue then becomes one of whether 
or not the trial court's "finding" of no prejudice in the news 
reports was proper. If that finding was proper, the court was 
. 
correct in not inquiring further. If not, the court's failure 
to poll the jurors as to their possible exposure to the report 
failed to assure the appellant of a fair trial, and requires 
reversal. 
As stated above, the appellant's trial and conviction 
some ten years ago were highly publicized, and the label, "Sugarhouse 
Rapist", given him by the press, was connnonly known. Indeed, 
the members of this Court themselves were probably familiar 
with the "Sugarhouse Rapist" even independent of any possible 
judicial connection with the case. And at the appellant's arrest 
and preliminary hearing, the media emphatically told the public 
that the "Sugarhouse Rapist" was again being tried for rape. 
However, the appellant was not generally known by his real name, 
which probably accounts for the fact that none of the prospective 
jurors recognized him at the onset of the trial. (T. 11) 
The prejudicial impact on a jury of the prior misdeeds 
of a criminal defendant has long been recognized by the courts, 
particularly where the prior conviction is similar to the crime 
charged. Recognizing this danger, the trial court took some 
measures to prevent the jury from finding out who the appellant 
was: All witnesses were to be admonished not to refer to the 
appellant's prior convictions, they were not to refer to the 
Sugarhouse area by that name (T. 4), and the news media were 
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ordered not to refer to the appellant's prior record or to refer 
to him as the "Sugarhouse Rapist" (To 91-92). The reasons for 
these orders was stated by the court: 
I am going to ask both counsel to admonish all 
witnesses that they make no reference to any prior 
rapes or convictions of any kinde To try this 
case strictly on the facts of this particular casee 
(T. 4) 
* * * 
I am going to do this, because I think it would 
be highly prejudicial to ref er to him in any news 
report as the "Sugarhouse Rapist"; I am going to 
issue an order that none of the news media is to 
use the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" during the course 
of the trial, because I think it is highly prejudicial. 
(T. 91) 
Although the trial court intelligently foresaw the explosive 
potential of prejudice to the appellant, should they jury learn 
that he was the notorious "Sugarhouse Rapist", the court's solution 
to the problem was less than adequate. Instead of simply sequesterin~ 
the jury during the trial (at least after it became apparent 
that the media were covering and reporting on the trial) as 
moved by counsel, the court chose to issue a gag order to the 
media. The gag order was improper for two reasons. First, 
it constituted a prior restraint on the media's First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech and Press rights, which restraint would have 
been unnecessary if the jury were sequestered. Second, the 
gag order did not adequately assure the appellant of a fair 
trial, for it left the jury at large during the times court 
was not in session, where they very likely were exposed to the 
media reports. 
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If one or more of the jurors had read or heard the prior 
news reports referring to the appellant as the "Sugarhouse Rapist", 
and then heard the news reports during his trial mentioning 
that some facts about the accused were not being disclosed due 
to a court order, they may easily have caught the connection, 
and been reminded of the prior news reports concerning the "Sugarhouse 
Rapist"o Indeed, the very mention of a court order prohibiting 
disclosure of facts about an accused which are already of public 
record fairly screams the message that someone has something 
to hide. Such a report, coupled with the reports at the time 
of the arrest and preliminary hearing which did call the appellant 
the "Sugarhouse Rapist", could certainly tip off an interested 
listener as to who this defendant really was. 
As to whether this actually happened in the present case, 
the appellant has no way of knowing. Such a risk of prejudice 
could have been avoided, had the trial court either sequestered 
the jurors, or at least asked them the simple question of whether 
or not they had been exposed to any on-going publicity concerning 
the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The circuit court was without authority to grant the 
State's discovery motion compelling the appellant to submit 
to blood and hair samples. The samples were therefore taken 
I 
without a valid court order or warrant, and the blood sample 
was taken in violation of the appellant's Fourth Amendment rights, 
and should have been suppressed by the trial court. The trial 
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court further connnitted prejudicial error in refusing to either 
sequester the jury or at least poll the jurors as to their possible 
exposure to the publicity surrounding the trial. The conviction 
should be reversed, and the case remanded to the Third District 
Court for a new trial. 
DATED this · / day of December, 1982. 
•.-· LYNN R . BROWN ' 
-·- Attorney for Appellant 
' 
\ ~ ; I 
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---Z, L ,_ --~'-
'.;' '·'-'"':....11'- I.... 
J. MARK ANDRUS 
A_,ttorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
day of December, 1982. 
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